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No. C87-6056 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
KYLE MILLER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LARRY D. LOFTHOUSE, D.D.S. 
Defendant and Respondent. 
000O000 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Kyle Miller ("Plaintiff" herein) 
respectfully submits this Reply Brief to respond to the new 
factual and legal issues raised by the Respondent's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, was 
not entitled to summary judgment upon the motion made and 
pleadings, together with affidavits, in the file. The Defendant 
attempts, in Respondent's Brief, to advance an altered standard 
and to raise inaccurate statements of facts. There are genuine 
issues as to material fact appropriate for trial. 
If the evidence on the record from Plaintiff, as is 
argued by Defendant, was insufficient for the purpose of showing 
a material question of fact concerning the medical malpractice of 
Defendant, for lack of adequate expert testimony, the court 
below, under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
should have granted additional time to Plaintiff to submit such 
expert testimony. 
POINTS IN REPLY, AND ARGUMENT 
The arguments of the Defendant, although persuasively 
presented, do not ring true because they are slightly, but 
significantly skewed from the established legal standard and from 
the evidence which was before the trial court. 
THE LEGAL STANDARD. 
On page 10 of Respondent's Brief, Defendant 
inaccurately presumes that lf[s]ummary judgment is the time for 
parties to establish that they can prove their case at trial." 
Defendant then argues further that Plaintiff Miller had time to 
submit, but failed to submit, expert evidence concerning the 
alleged malpractice. 
The time which Plaintiff had prior to the hearing is 
not the foundation upon which support for an order for summary 
judgment can be built. Those arguments would be appropriate in 
connection with a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for 
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failure to prosecute. (The need for extra time is an issue, 
however, as provided for by Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The issue is argued in Appellant's Brief and referred 
to below.) Further, there is no admission, affidavit or other 
evidence in the record concerning Plaintiff's use of time upon 
which such an issue could be judiciously resolved. 
Notwithstanding that point, however, Plaintiff respectfully 
suggests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that it 
is sometimes difficult to arrange for the testimony of experts 
before discovery is complete. 
The long-standing standard for a motion for summary 
judgment is not "to establish that a case can be proven"; but 
rather is for the movant to show the court, based upon the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the law, as 
applied to the established facts, leads to the conclusion that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care 740 P.2d. 262, at 263 (Utah 
App. 1987); Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure The 
difference is important. A party opposing a motion to summary 
judgment need not prove their case at the time of the summary 
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proceeding, but instead need only show that one or more material 
questions of fact exist (or that for any other reason the moving 
party is not entitled to the judgment). 
THERE ARE MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF PACT. 
A. In Respondent's Brief, Defendant attempts to 
demonstrate by his recitation of facts that no question of 
material fact exists. Defendant, however, relies upon assertions 
which are not fully established by the affidavits or other 
evidence before the court. Further, Defendant's own evidence 
raises questions of fact. 
An example relates to the issue of Defendant's 
negligence after the injury. In paragraph 6 of Respondent's 
Statement of Facts, Defendant states that Plaintiff was requested 
to return in six (6) months, because numbness in the mouth region 
" *** most often resolves spontaneously within six (6) months 
***". And, in paragraph 7 of that section of his brief, facts 
are asserted concerning a follow-up visit by Plaintiff to 
Defendant and advice allegedly given by Dr. Lofthouse. However, 
there is no evidence in the record, by affidavit or otherwise, as 
to the visits alleged or the reasons which Defendant may have 
chosen for his alleged behavior. Further, the Affidavit of 
Dr. Israelsen, for Defendant, makes a subtly, but strikingly 
different statement concerning his opinion regarding such 
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numbness. In paragraph 10 of his Affidavit, Dr. Israelsen 
cautiously stated that numbness resulting from injury or trauma 
to the lingual nerve 
*** often repairs naturally with sensation 
returning to the affected area within six (6) 
months. However, permanent numbness can 
occur, which is considered a bad result, *** 
Defendant's exaggeration in his brief, that such numbness most 
often resolves itself, draws attention to the unresolved material 
question of fact concerning Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant 
negligently treated him after damaging the nerve. 
Careful scrutiny of a key portion of Dr. Israelsen's 
Affidavit reveals another failure to establish a material fact. 
In paragraph 14e) of Defendant's Statement of Facts, Defendant 
asserts that Dr. Israelsen formed the opinion that such numbness 
" *** is a result that can occur without negligence on the part 
of the dentist in the extraction of an impacted wisdom tooth; 
***." An investigation of the sworn statement by Dr. Israelsen, 
in comparison with Defendant's quoted characterization indicates 
that the witness took a more cautious approach. See paragraph 10 
of the Affidavit of Dr. Israelsen, pages 3 and 4, where 
Dr. Israelsen states: 
*** permanent numbness can occur, which is 
considered a bad result, but not a result that 
in and of itself is attributable to any 
negligence on the part of the dentist, 
[emphasis supplied] 
See also paragraph 12 of that Affidavit, on page 4. 
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The fact that it is possible for such numbness to occur 
without negligence gives rise to a reasonable inference (in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiff) that it is at least equally 
possible that it would occur as a result of negligence. Under 
scrutiny, the statement raises doubts, which must be construed in 
favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Robinson, supra. 
at 263. 
It is also important to observe that Dr. Israelsen's 
carefully worded testimony does not clearly state a conclusion, 
but rather acknowledges one of an apparent set of possibilities. 
Further, the acknowledgment is in the abstract, and is made 
without specific reference to Mr. Miller's mouth; because 
Dr. Israelsen made no examination of Mr. Miller, or of records 
concerning the condition of Mr. Miller's mouth, after the 
operation. 
The court below should have determined, therefore, 
without reference to opposing affidavits by Plaintiff, that 
Defendant fciiled to carry its burden. 
B. Plaintiff, in Appellant's Brief, showed that the 
evidence before the court established that questions of material 
fact do exist. The letter of Dr. Austin, at least when it is 
reviewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establishes 
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factual issues sufficient that the court below should have denied 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See the argument on 
pages 7-11 of Appellant's Brief. 
Respondent's Brief only mentions that letter to argue 
that Dr. Austin does not establish plaintiff's case. Whether it 
did, or did not, is not the issue. It is elementary that a 
summary proceeding is to determine if an issue of fact exists, 
not to decide one. 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO SECURE AND SUBMIT AFFIDAVITS. 
If the letter and affidavit, considered in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiff, were not sufficient to raise a 
material question of fact; then they were at least sufficient 
(together with counsel's request made in open court) to give 
notice that such testimony was obtainable. There is no 
requirement that a separate affidavit or written motion be filed 
to raise the issue. The court below, therefore, should have 
granted Plaintiff additional time to present such an affidavit 
under the provisions of Rule 56(f). 
Defendant asserts and argues, concerning this issue, 
that Plaintiff made no request for additional time. See the 
Statement of Facts in Respondent's Brief, paragraph 12. It is to 
be noted, however, that the assertion made therein is 
inconsistent with the carefully sworn testimony of Defendant's 
attorney. A comparison of the affidavits of attorney Reed Brown 
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and attorney David Epperson, attached to the respective Briefs, 
reveals no contradiction between them. Mr. Epperson testified 
clearly that no requests were made by Mr. Brown prior to the 
hearing. [Epperson Affidavit, paragraph 6.] Mr. Brown stated 
that the request for " *** an additional thirty (30) days to 
conduct discovery and/or otherwise obtain expert testimony in 
opposition to the Affidavit submitted by Defendant ***" was made 
at the hearing; and that the request was discussed with the 
Court, but denied. [Brown Affidavit, paragraph 4.] Plaintiff 
submits that the trial court erred by refusing this request. 
ROBINSON PRECEDENT. 
It is important to note that the Defendant relies 
strongly upon statements made by the court in the Robinson 
opinion to establish his arguments. As indicated in Appellant's 
Brief, Plaintiff also finds value in that opinion. 
It is of significant importance that, in Robinson, the 
trial court granted additional time to the Plaintiff to obtain an 
affidavit from an expert witness. [Robinson, supra., P. 264.] 
In this matter the affidavits and pleadings show that medical 
expert testimony is available to establish Plaintiff's negligence 
claims, and, thereby, a material question of fact. However, if 
the court below did not agree, Plaintiff should have been given 
the same opportunity, in equity, under law, and specifically 
pursuant to Rule 56(f), to do so. 
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It is significant, however, to note that the issues in 
Robinson are to be distinguished from those in the case at bar. 
Although there is no substitute for a careful review of the 
opinion, the Court's conclusion reveals the Robinson context and 
the relevant opinion of the Court: 
We agree that trial courts should be 
extremely cautious in granting summary 
judgment for a defendant on the basis that 
plaintiff has failed to secure expert 
testimony to support a medical negligence 
action. Chiero v» Chicago Osteopathic Hosp>, 
[citation omitted]. But, appellant contends 
that a plaintiff suing on a theory of res ipsa 
loquitur is always is entitled to a trial on 
the merits, so that summary judgment is always 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Such an a r g u m e n t 
miscomprehends the purpose and application of 
the doctrine, as well as the pretrial 
responsibilities of a plaintiff faced with a 
summary judgment motion. In this regard, we 
concur in the reasoning of the appellate court 
quoted in Chiero: 
We agree that if there is any 
sound basis to do so, a trial court 
should reject summary judgment in this 
type of case. Where, however, the record 
indicates that Plaintiff has [had] every 
opportunity to establish his case and has 
failed to demonstrate that he could show 
negligent acts or omissions . . . [on the 
part of the] defendant by expert medical 
testimony, where the issue is clearly one 
which cannot be determined by laymen 
alone, summary judgment could be allowed. 
[citations omitted]. 
[Robinson, Supra, at p. 267.] 
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Plaintiff submits that Miller has not had every 
opportunity to establish or demonstrate to the trial court that 
he could show negligent acts or omissions on the part of the 
Defendant by expert medical testimony, 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not carry his burden in relation to 
his motion for summary judgment, in that he failed to establish 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is 
entitled to judgment, based upon the facts before the court, as a 
matter of law. In fact, scrutiny of the evidence submitted by 
the Defendant, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as is 
required for the benefit of the opposing party in a motion for 
summary judgment, indicates that questions of fact were raised, 
by Defendant, alone. Further, the evidence before the trial 
court, including the opinion of Dr. Austin, established questions 
of material fact. 
If the trial court found that the submission of expert 
testimony was insufficient, then, based upon the Affidavit of 
Kyle Miller, and the request of his counsel at the hearing, 
additional time under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure should have been granted to Plaintiff to allow him an 
opportunity to submit that expert testimony for consideration. 
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The court, in either case, should not have granted the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the said 
judgment should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Q day of May, 1989. 
TAYLOR,
 /^NN]E^GA^^AJ3iy^&~l^W^ 
rneysy for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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